Four shades of Open Skies: European Union and four main external partners  by Christidis, Panayotis
Journal of Transport Geography 50 (2016) 105–114Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Transport Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / j t rangeoFour shades of Open Skies: European Union and four main external
partnershttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2015.04.005
0966-6923/ 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
E-mail address: Panayotis.Christidis@ec.europa.euPanayotis Christidis
European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, c/Inca Garcilaso 3, ES-41092 Seville, Spaina r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 31 December 2014
Revised 16 April 2015
Accepted 20 April 2015
Available online 30 April 2015
Keywords:
Air transport agreements
Liberalisation
Airport competition
European Uniona b s t r a c t
The Open Skies agreements are in the centre of the European Union’s external aviation policy. They form
the basis of liberalisation of aviation between the EU and the rest of the world, opening up markets and
promoting fair competition. The progress made since the original road map in 2005 depended both on the
priorities of the European side and the individual strategy of each external partner. This paper discusses
the status of the EU’s aviation relations with four important partners: USA, Russia, Morocco and Turkey.
Aviation liberalisation is at a different stage of maturity in the four examples. The evolution of trafﬁc
over time can give an insight into the impact that gradual liberalisation had in each case: total trafﬁc
grows faster when restrictions are lifted, but new demand is not spread equally across airports on either
side. The impact on concentration, measured with the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) at airport level,
varies signiﬁcantly between the various markets. Political, geographic, demographic and economic
factors inﬂuence the airline network dynamics and lead to distinct patterns of expansion. Special
emphasis is given to the analysis of the role of airline alliances, ownership limitations and speciﬁc
obstacles such as the visa limitations and the Siberian overﬂight royalties.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Liberalisation in aviation, as in any industry, can stimulate
important structural changes and lead to drastic changes in the
patterns of operation of airlines and airports. The liberalisation
process that the European Union (EU) has implemented within
the EU can be seen in the development of a highly competitive
landscape in European aviation. The external aviation policy of
the EU, expressed as Open Skies agreements with third countries,
is the main expression of liberalisation of international aviation
between EU and its external partners.
From a transport geography point of view, it is interesting to
analyse how Open Skies agreements can inﬂuence the dynamics
of aviation activity between the EU and the rest of the world,
and explore whether they lead to a concentration or a dispersion
of activity in spatial terms. Given the international dimension of
the Open Skies agreements, is of special interest to analyse how
competition between airports is affected. Most of the existing liter-
ature addresses either competition between airlines at various
geographic levels, or competition between airports at regional
level.
The methodology and the analysis presented here address the
spatial dimension of the impacts of liberalisation and the factorsthat inﬂuence the patterns of competition between airports at
international level. The main research question is how does the
degree of liberalisation, in combination with the economic and
geographic characteristics of a speciﬁc market, inﬂuence the evolu-
tion of international air transport networks and the degree of con-
centration in airport trafﬁc shares. While opening up markets are
generally expected to have an impact in terms of overall demand,
the spatial distribution of the changes in demand may be affected
by limitations in supply that have not been fully removed.
Several studies, including Oum et al. (2010) and Goetz and
Vowles (2009) argue that liberalisation decreases prices and
increases passenger volumes. Removing supply limitations allows
new airlines to enter the market or existing ones to extend their
offer. The increased levels of competition between airlines press
the operators to reduce costs and proﬁt margins. Especially where
low cost carriers have an increased presence, lower prices attract
higher passenger demand. Button (2009) outlines the type of ben-
eﬁts expected from liberalisation, but also underlines that not
everyone is a winner. Non-competitive destinations, airlines or air-
ports may also lose trafﬁc and market share. In addition, establish-
ing a cause and effect link between liberalisation and changes in
the market is not straightforward. Pitﬁeld (2009) highlights the dif-
ﬁculty in measuring the real impacts of liberalisation and the need
for methodological improvements in order to be in a position to
attribute its role in market developments.
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lution of their networks are relevant issues that have been
explored in detail by Dobruszkes (2006). While liberalisation is
clearly the underlying force that allows the emergence of low cost
carriers, full service network carriers still maintain a dominant role
in the main European airports. One reason cited is the develop-
ment of hub-and-spoke networks centred around one or a few
hub airports. Low cost airlines prefer point-to-point connection
predominantly between secondary airports. Lian and Ronnevik
(2011) and Costa et al. (2010) discuss the competition between
central and regional airports, in Norway and Brazil respectively,
and identify a trend in favour of the central ones. The way each
market is affected is explained by a combination of supply (prices
and frequencies) and demand (traveller socio-economic character-
istics), as well as geographical aspects (distance). Increasing ﬂight
distances also favours the development of hub-and-spoke net-
works (Lin, 2012). Burghouwt and Hakfoort (2001) ﬁnd evidence
of concentration of trans-Atlantic ﬂights in a few hub airports, con-
trary to the lack of such a pattern for intra-European ﬂights.
Airport competition is usually analysed in terms of catchment
areas, or airport hinterland (Hess and Polak (2005), Luken and
Garrow (2011)). Pels et al. (2009) identify the factors that affect
airport choice, while Tierney and Kuby (2008) explore the com-
bined choice of airport and airline. In both cases, the trade-off
between price and frequency is a determinant of user choices
and- as a consequence- deﬁnes airline strategies. Fu et al. (2010)
explore the mechanisms that lead to changes in aviation trafﬁc
ﬂow patterns and suggest that liberalisation stimulates efﬁciency
gains within and across continental markets. This involves the
optimisation of airline networks and often leads to the formation
of airline alliances. In parallel, the importance of low cost carriers
in maximising the beneﬁts from liberalisation is also emphasised.
There are, however, several barriers to market entry that
strengthen the role of incumbents and their alliances, preventing
new operators compete for the market.
Berechman and De Wit (1996) use a network simulation model
to compare different airline network options in the context of the
deregulated European aviation market. Adopting a hub-and-spoke
network with a speciﬁc airport as its hub appears to be a strategy
that maximises airline proﬁts and deters entry by potential rivals.
Alves and Forte (2015) conﬁrm that airline strategies involving alli-
ances may distort competition in trans-Atlantic markets. In the
case of ﬂights between Portugal and Brazil, such alliances may lead
to market collusion that prevent the appearance of new competi-
tors. Morandi et al. (2014) analyse direct and connecting ﬂights
between the EU and USA during a typical off-peak week. Their
results suggest that the competition between carriers, alliances
and hub airports has led to a decrease in the number of direct
transatlantic connections. The increased overall trafﬁc tends to
be attracted by the main alliances and their respective hubs. The
issue of market dominance by airlines or airports is also discussed
in Starkie (2012). A link between liberalisation – aided by new air-
line business models and new information technology – and
decreased level of airport competition is implied.
Koo and Lohmann (2013) compare the impacts of deregulation
in Australia and Brazil, explaining the trend for market concentra-
tion in Brazil as a result of high policy volatility which posed lim-
itations to the supply side. The more predictable and open policy in
Australia helped in keeping the spatial distribution of growth in
aviation quite stable. Adler et al. (2014) model the impacts of lib-
eralisation of the transport market in Northeast Asia and expect
beneﬁts for both consumers and airlines. The beneﬁts are not,
however distributed evenly across or within market players. A
main factor that affects the extent and distribution of beneﬁts
appears to be airport slot availability. Slot allocation policies can
effectively distort the supply side of the market and limit overallbeneﬁts. The impact of supply side policy intervention is also dis-
cussed in Calzada and Fageda (2014). Their analysis of subsidies on
speciﬁc low volume market indicates that such measures on one
hand increase passenger volumes and decrease prices but – on
the other – drastically limit competition, often to a single airline.
The review of the relevant literature suggests that aviation lib-
eralisation can trigger several changes in the operational model of
airlines that affect their network design. Competition between air-
ports is also affected as a result, depending on the speciﬁc geo-
graphic situation and market conditions. The example of four
international aviation markets is used here in order to analyse
how these conditions actually inﬂuence the spatial dimension of
competition in aviation.
2. The policy context
The EU internal aviation market is one of the clearest examples
of how European integration can lead to the creation of a single
market. Before 1992, the milestone year for the development of
the EU Singe Market, the EU aviation market was fragmented
among the national markets of its Member States, each adhering
to a restrictive bilateral agreement with each of the other
Member States. After 1992, all national markets of the EU
Member States (which eventually became 28) were merged into a
single EU aviation market and all national carriers are considered
as EU carriers. The immediate effect for the aviation sector was that
no restrictions on capacity, market access and pricing were possi-
ble. Common rules on aviation were applied across the EU, espe-
cially as regards market opening. In particular, investment and
airline ownership barriers were removed and common regulations
were developed on awide range of issues (safety, security, air trafﬁc
management, travellers’ rights, environmental impacts of aviation).
The external aviation policy of the European Union is more
recent but largely builds on the success of the internal aviation pol-
icy (European Commission, 2012). It follows the guidelines of the
Road Map developed in year 2005 by the Council of the
European Union and the European Commission (European
Commission, 2005). The Road Map was based on three pillars:
a. Bringing existing bilateral air services agreements between
EU Member States and third countries in line with EU law:
the Open Skies policy of the European Union implies that
bilateral agreements between an EU Member State and a
third country are not allowed to include any nationality
clauses. Any EU carrier should be allowed to operate
between the EU Member State and the third country. This
made necessary that about 1500 pre-existing bilateral
agreements of the Member States were updated. While more
than 900 agreements with 107 countries have been already
amended, in the case of 45 third countries the progress was
even faster. Horizontal agreements were signed, in practice
replacing all the bilateral agreements of the given third
country with all EU Member States.
b. Creating a true Common Aviation Area with the neighbour-
ing countries: as part of its external aviation policy, the EU
encourages neighbouring external partners to adopt the EU
legislation on aviation rules, initially regarding safety
requirements. Successive phases of a potential convergence
include market opening and progressive regulatory harmon-
isation. The European Common Aviation Area, the group of
countries sharing the common EU aviation rules can eventu-
ally include up to 58 states with a total population of 1 bil-
lion inhabitants.
c. Concluding aviation agreements with key strategic partners:
the third important pillar of the EU external aviation policy
is the conclusion of aviation agreements with strategic
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markets. A wider liberalisation focus is used in such cases,
aiming at establishing processes for the liberalisation of air-
line ownership, as well as regulatory convergence in matters
of safety and security, competition, environment and pas-
sengers’ rights.
The European Union external aviation policy sees two main
types of mutual beneﬁts from the liberalisation of the aviation
markets between the EU and third countries. Opening the market
can create new economic and investment opportunities. Based on
the example of the liberalisation of the internal aviation market,
opening up the international market is expected to allow growth
in air transport demand, new markets, more options for users
and new markets for operators. At the same time, liberalisation
can ensure fair competition at international level through regula-
tory convergence in terms of competition rules, State aid or
standards.
Agreements have been already signed with several neighbour-
ing countries in the form of Euro-Mediterranean Aviation
Agreements (Morocco, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM,
Montenegro, Serbia, UN Mission to Kosovo, Jordan, Georgia,
Moldova and Israel) and a few main international partners (USA,
Canada and Brazil). Negotiations are at an advanced stage with
Ukraine, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, Algeria, Australia and New
Zealand. Some progress has been made in discussions with
Armenia, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Russia, China, India, Japan,
the Gulf States and ASEAN members, which may potentially lead
to the signature of new agreements.
The progress in the negotiation of agreements between the EU
and third countries depends to a large extent on the willingness
of the EU’s potential partners to deregulate their local market by
removing limitations to the demand and supply for air transport.3. Methodology
The approach presented here addresses the question of how the
speciﬁc characteristics of each market segment inﬂuence the
impacts of the EU policy on liberalisation as seen in the geographic
distribution of its external market. Each market segment has its
own geographic, demographic, socio-economic and political
aspects that affect its activity and spatial distribution. At the same
time, the type of agreement with the EU and the progress towards
the achievement of full market opening differs signiﬁcantly among
the various external partners of the EU and is likely to be reﬂected
in the geographic patterns of their linkages.
Four important markets1 for the EU are examined, each consti-
tuting a different example of international agreement and degree
of liberalisation. The EU–USA market can be considered as mature
in terms of demand. There is an EU–US Air Transport Agreement
already in place that replaced all bilateral agreements of EU
Member States with the USA (ﬁrst pillar of the Road Map) and the
negotiations for a full Open Skies agreement (third pillar) are in an
advanced phase. The EU–Morocco market is the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from
an agreement between the EU and a neighbouring country (second
pillar). The EU and Turkey signed a horizontal agreement (ﬁrst pillar)
as recently as 2010, while negotiations with Russia for an horizontal
agreement are advancing but have not been successful so far. The
four markets (USA, Morocco, Turkey and Russia) represent 25% of
total air passenger trips between the EU and the rest of the world.
Analysing the trends in the growth of their aviation activity, in terms
of volumes, spatial distribution and concentration gives an1 The term ‘market’ is used here in the sense of total passenger trips between
airports in the EU and airports in the third country concerned, in both directionsindication on whether the process of liberalisation is indeed con-
tributing to achieving the goals of the policy.
The analysis is based on data from EUROSTAT from year 2002 to
2012 (EUROSTAT, 2014). The data correspond to passenger trips at
airport origin- destination level between the EU and the four exter-
nal markets examined. Additionally, data from SABRE for year 2012
(SABRE, 2014) was used in order to complement the analysis with
information concerning the connections that used each origin–des-
tination pair as a leg that formed part of a trip chain involving
another ﬂight before and/or after the leg in question. Such data is
of particular importance, since it allows the identiﬁcation of air-
ports that act as a hub in multi-leg trips with origins or destina-
tions in other EU, partner country or third country airports.
The degree to which spatial distribution and competition is
affected can be measured using the well-known Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index:
H ¼
Xn
i¼1
ðs2i Þ
where for each airport i, si represents its market share in each exter-
nal EU market.
A market with one player having a 100% market share would
have an H value of 1. Two players with a 50% share each would lead
to an H index of 0.5. A market with one player having a market
share of 50% and ﬁve players each having 10% would result in H
being equal to 0.3. The closer the H index is to 0, the more dis-
persed and competitive the market. The H index can be applied
for each of the four external markets of the EU analysed here in
order to estimate the degree of concentration of the market in
terms of how passenger trafﬁc is distributed among the airports
in either market. For example, how European airports share trafﬁc
to USA, or how US airports share trafﬁc to Europe will be treated
separately. The index has a temporal dimension as well, something
that allows the creation of data series and the analysis of how con-
centration changes over time.
4. Overall trends
Air transport activity in the EU has increased signiﬁcantly in the
period 2002 to 2012, even though the ﬁnancial crisis slowed down
growth after 2008. Passenger trips between the EU and the rest of
the world increased by 50% in the same period, showing steady
growth that has not been apparently affected by the slowdown
except in the case of the USA market, which has stalled at the
2009 levels (Fig. 1). The EU–Russia market, which quickly recov-
ered from a brief dip in 2009, increased by 250% overall in the
10 year period. The EU–Morocco market also grew at an impressive
rate, to be only halted in 2012 due to the political instability in
Northern Africa. The growth in activity between the EU and
Turkey accelerated signiﬁcantly after 2010. Comparing the trends
in the four markets offers a mixed picture as regards the possible
impact of liberalisation on passenger demand. The EU–Russia mar-
ket is the least open of the four, with important limitations on both
demand (visa requirements) and supply (airline ownership,
charges, capacity allocation, State aid to local airlines) for air trans-
port services, but demonstrates the highest growth rate in the per-
iod, more than double that of the total external aviation market of
the EU. The largest part of the growth can be explained by the
increase in travel demand from Russia to Europe, stimulated by
the higher disposable income a large number of travellers in
Russia enjoyed. On the other hand, the EU–Morocco market is
the one where virtually all limitations on the supply side have been
removed. This has probably led to increased passenger volumes
from Europe to Morocco, coupled with a modest (compared to
the Russian case) increase of travellers from Morocco to Europe.
Fig. 1. Evolution of total passenger activity for aviation per main EU external market, year 2002 = 100.
2 The ‘behind’ and ‘beyond’ connection types correspond to ﬂows from the USA to
the EU. For ﬂows between the EU and the USA the two terms would be obviously
interchanged.
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fast economic development experienced in Turkey during the per-
iod, given that the liberalisation of the market has been limited. It
is surprising to notice that the EU–USA market, even though at an
advanced stage of the liberalisation process, has grown slower than
the other three markets or the total EU external market.
In terms of market concentration, a clear tendency towards a
more competitive market was already evident before 2002. As
Fig. 2 implies, all four markets were served by several EU airports,
with H indexes ranging from 0.037 to 0.14 in year 2002. The value
of the index decreased even more by 2012 for all four markets,
though with some important differences which signify changes
in the pattern of development as a result of the liberalisation pro-
cess. The EU–Morocco market obviously became more competitive
(in terms of EU airports serving it) after 2007, a milestone year as
regards its aviation liberalisation process. Conversely, The EU–USA
market started a trend of concentration to fewer EU airports, a
counter-intuitive trend that, nevertheless, can be explained by
the increased number of Trans-Atlantic ﬂights using Heathrow as
the airport on the European side. Even though progress on liberal-
isation in the EU–Russia market was slow on the ofﬁcial front, the
competitive landscape has signiﬁcantly improved as regards EU
airports offering ﬂights. On the other hand, the most dispersed
market of the four, EU–Turkey, seems to have reached a saturation
point, with no further decrease in its airport competition index
after 2010.
4.1. The EU–USA market
The EU–US Air Transport Agreement between the EU and the
United States was signed in 2007 with a second, more extensive
agreement signed in 2010. The First Stage Agreement allowed all
EU airlines to ﬂy without restrictions from any point in the EU to
any point in the US. The agreement initially stimulated an increase
in activity, especially in operations that were not covered by the
pre-existing bilateral agreements. At the same time, however, it
accelerated a trend for closer alliance agreements between airlines
and transformed the competition for the market into effectively a
game between a few major hub carriers. The Second Stage
Agreement included some improvements as regards investment
and market access opportunities, but given the lack of progress
as regards airline ownership limitations on the USA side, it has
not in practice changed the competition situation.Although the ultimate objective of the European Union is to cre-
ate a transatlantic Open Aviation Area, a single air transport mar-
ket with free ﬂows of investment and no restrictions on air
services, this situation has not yet been reached.
While there are about 20 airports in the USA that offer direct
connections to the EU with considerable passenger volumes, most
of them have an important share of passenger trafﬁc that uses
them, or the connecting airport in the EU, as a hub in a longer trip
chain. Fig. 3 shows the main USA airports in the EU–USA market,
with their total passenger volume and the share of each connection
type:
 Local: Trips that started at the speciﬁc USA airport and ﬁnished
at the connecting EU airport, without any further connections
on either side (or vice versa).
 Behind: Trips that started at another airport, used the USA air-
port as a hub, and ended at an EU airport.
 Beyond: Trips that start at the speciﬁc USA airport, used the
connecting EU airport as a hub, and ended at another airport.
 Bridge: Trips that started at another airport, used the USA air-
port as a ﬁrst hub, used the connecting EU airport as a second
hub, and ended at another airport.
The share of ‘beyond’ connections is high for the airports in the
western part of the USA, while airports in the eastern part tend to
have high shares for both ‘behind’ and ‘beyond’ connections2. This
means that airports that are traditional hubs for US carriers (Atlanta,
Chicago, Philadelphia) serve as a point of concentration of passen-
gers connecting from other North-American airports with a ﬁnal
destination an EU airport with which they are directly connected.
They also serve, at the same time, trafﬁc that originates in their area
that uses an EU airport as a hub to connect with another short haul
ﬂight in Europe or a long haul ﬂight to Asia or Africa. Airports in the
western part serve, apart from the direct ‘local’ trafﬁc (i.e. Los-
Angeles to London), trafﬁc from their area to a connecting airport
that offers a link to a third airport in Europe or Africa (e.g. Los
Angeles to London, connecting with ﬂights to Brussels or Cairo). A
smaller share of ﬂights serves ‘behind’ connections, mainly connect-
ing Australia and Hawaii with Europe via Los Angeles. The airports in
Fig. 2. Evolution of HHI indicator of competition between EU airports for the four EU external markets analysed (%).
Fig. 3. Top US airports for US–EU ﬂows, total passenger volume in 2012 and share of connection type.
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connections, as a result of the high volume of trafﬁc they attract or
generate and the numerous direct connections they have with
European airports.
Nevertheless, the share of ‘bridge’ connections is negligible,
something that implies that only a very small part of the market
corresponds to trip chains requiring two hub connections. Most
of the hub airports achieve a balance between the three main con-
nection types, something that reinforces their role as a hub and
creates economies of density and scale. Their position and demand
proﬁle also allowed the formation of a virtuous cycle through the
development of airline alliances. Most major carriers on either side
of the Atlantic participate in one of the three major airline alliancesat global level. As a result, most ﬂights between North America and
Europe are coordinated between partner airlines and involve at
least one of the partners’ major hubs.
The trend for concentration in few airports is more evident on
the European side. (Fig. 4) Although several EU airports offer con-
nections to the USA, the four big hub airports of London Heathrow,
Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle and Amsterdam, are clearly the
leading players. Being the major hubs for the European partners
of the major airline alliances, they concentrate a high share of ‘be-
yond’ and ‘behind’ connections in the EU–USAmarket. Especially in
the case of Heathrow, the operation as a major hub for the route
has led to increased levels of efﬁciency that attract even more con-
nections that ‘crowd out’ connections with other, less lucrative,
Fig. 4. Top European airports for USA–EU ﬂows, total passenger volume in 2012 and share of each US connecting airport.
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more specialised in the USA-Europe market and the market
became more concentrated on a few major hubs serving the
market.
It is evident that geography plays an important role and leads to
supply side limitations. The character of competition in the trans-
Atlantic market limits the options for low cost airlines or point-to-
point connections by small operators. The fact that the major airli-
nes have created alliances and concentrate their activities in a
small number of hubs may be increasing their own efﬁciency,
but at the same time functions as a major obstacle for the entrance
of new competitors. Even when alternative airports are available
(as for example in London or New York), alliances maintain a
marked competitive advantage by concentrating activities in the
main hub airports (Heathrow and JFK, respectively). In addition,
the ownership regulation maintained by the USA side is a clear pol-
icy-led limitation that probably prevents liberalisation from
achieving its full impact. Even though ticket prices have fallen in
the period, there is no evidence that this has been the result of lib-
eralisation per se, if one takes into account the general trend in the
aviation industry as a whole for higher efﬁciency and reduced
prices. It is quite probable that the removal of the remaining sup-
ply side limitations would bring more competition at both airline
and airport level and lead to even lower prices.
4.2. The EU–Morocco market
The agreement signed in 2006 between the EU and Morocco
was the ﬁrst Euro-Mediterranean agreement. It was not only an
agreement to open markets on the two sides, but also included
an extensive adaptation of aviation legislation in Morocco to the
EU rules and regulations on safety, competition laws, air trafﬁc
management and consumer protection. The agreement, which
allows 3rd and 4th freedoms for both Moroccan and EU airlines,
in practice removed all capacity limitations, attracted new entrantsto the market and opened the way for new ﬂights to underserved
airports. Apart from the case of the EU–US negotiations, the EU–
Morocco agreement is the ﬁrst in the history of the EU with a coun-
try located outside Europe. It covers the full scope of liberalisation
principles identiﬁed by the EU external aviation policy, including
trafﬁc and economic rights in all ﬁelds of aviation operations.
The agreement removes all capacity restrictions and in effect
means that the Moroccan market operates as part of an extended
EU deregulated market.
The liberalisation process allowed a rapid decentralization of
ﬂights between the EU and Morocco (Fig. 5). Four main and several
smaller airports in Morocco offer direct ﬂights to more than ﬁfty
EU destinations. An important factor for the growth in overall pas-
senger volumes and the wide spatial distribution of connecting
imports was the entrance of low cost carriers (LCC) into the mar-
ket. The LCC require lower annual passenger volumes for the oper-
ation of a direct inter-city service, something that allows them to
exploit airport combinations with moderate but proﬁtable trafﬁc.
Spreading possible connections to a wider range of airports also
allows airlines to reach more passengers from the two main EU–
Morocco markets: tourists from the EU that can reach more desti-
nations in Morocco directly, without the need to use a main EU air-
port, and Moroccan immigrants in Europe who travel back to
Morocco or have visitors from Morocco. Connections to Morocco
are predominantly in countries with higher Moroccan immigration
rates (France and Belgium), as well as markets for which Morocco
is a main touristic destination (Italy and the Netherlands) . The
existence of such connections is also simulating business interac-
tions and tourism from Morocco to the EU, which both add to
the growth in total passenger demand. Having removed all regula-
tory limitations to the supply of air transport services, the evolu-
tion of the market depends on purely market demand. This is
aided by the fact that the distance from Morocco to Western
Europe does not create signiﬁcant operational limitations for either
point-to-point services or low cost carriers.
Fig. 5. Top airports for EU–Morocco ﬂows, total passenger volume in 2012 and share of each Moroccan connecting airport.
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The horizontal air transport agreement between the EU and
Turkey is quite recent, signed in March 2010. It removed the
nationality restrictions from the existing bilateral agreements
and allows any EU airline to operate ﬂights between any EU
Member State and Turkey, where a bilateral agreement with
Turkey exists and trafﬁc rights are available. The agreement did
not replace the bilateral agreements in place between EU
Member States and Turkey but adapted them to bring them into
line with EU law. The remaining priorities of the EU external avia-
tion policy are, however, still under discussion. This results in the
possibility for Turkey to impose several restrictions to the supply
of air transport services through limited capacity allocation and
to provide direct or indirect support to local and/or state owned
operators.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the more liberalized EU–Morocco
market discussed above, the partial opening of the EU–Turkey
already has a visible impact in terms of passenger volumes and air-
port competition (Fig. 6). The spatial distribution of EU airports
with connections to Turkey follows a similar pattern as that in
the EU–Morocco market. It reﬂects patterns of Turkish immigra-
tion in Germany, the Netherlands and other parts of Western
Europe, as well as the main origins of tourists from the EU to
Turkey. On the Turkish side there is a higher concentration in air-
port competition. The two Istanbul airports and Antalya attract the
majority of connections. Istanbul, apart from its own attraction as a
destination and the global demand generated by its large urban
population, is investing in its role as a hub airport that exploits
its geographic position. In fact, it now serves as a point for connec-
tion between the EU and certain areas in Central Asia and the
Middle East, used by 3.7 million passengers in 2012. For the EU
to China, South-East Asia or the Far East markets, however, it
seems that other European or Gulf area airports are still the major
competitors.4.4. The EU–Russia market
The EU is Russia’s largest international aviation market, with
more than 40% of all scheduled Russian passenger trafﬁc directed
towards EU destinations. However, aviation relations between
Russia and the EU have been difﬁcult, the main issues being EU air-
line designation and Siberian overﬂight royalties. Russia has still
not introduced the necessary changes in all its bilateral air services
agreements with EUMember States in order to recognise EU airline
designation. As regards Siberian overﬂight royalties, which non-
Russian airlines are charged, the EU and Russia reached an agree-
ment on the phasing-out of these royalties (in the framework of
Russia’s WTO accession negotiations in 2011), but Russia has not
yet removed the charges.
The lack of progress in these agreements means that the EU–
Russia aviation market is not ‘open’ in the sense of market liberal-
isation. Since the possibility of operating a ﬂight between an EU
Member State and Russia depends on the speciﬁc bilateral agree-
ment the EU Member State has signed with Russia, there are strong
barriers to entry, especially as regards the access to Russian air-
ports and the possibility of other EU airlines to compete in the
market. This has not prevented the explosive growth of air passen-
ger trafﬁc between the two sides, but has created certain imbal-
ances as regards the competition between airports for the market
(Fig. 7). As regards Russian airports, the current situation limits
connections, with a few exceptions, to the three Moscow interna-
tional airports and to St. Petersburg. These four airports play the
role of hubs for the rest of the Russian market. On the European
side, the distribution of the main airports with connections to
Russia follows the pattern of Russian business and tourism inter-
ests. Perhaps surprisingly, the two airports in Cyprus, Larnaca
and Paphos, appear as the main EU airport serving the Russian
market. Relative proximity and, most importantly, the large num-
ber of Russian tourists, immigrants and businesspersons preferring
Cyprus as a destination explain the result to a large extent. Other
Fig. 6. Top airports for EU–Turkey ﬂows, total passenger volume in 2012 and share of each Turkish connecting airport.
Fig. 7. Top airports for EU–Russia ﬂows, total passenger volume in 2012 and share of each Russian connecting airport.
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Russians also show high passenger volumes (Montenegro, airports
in the French, Italian and Spanish coasts). The four main EU air-
ports (London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaul, Frankfurt and
Amsterdam) still have considerable passenger trafﬁc to/fromRussia, but do not have such a prominent role as in other long
hauls markets, as e.g. in the example of the USA above.
Vienna and the four main Scandinavian airports (Copenhagen,
Stockholm, Helsinki and Oslo) reﬂect in their trafﬁc the importance
that the Russian market has for their geopolitical and business
P. Christidis / Journal of Transport Geography 50 (2016) 105–114 113interests. On the other hand, however, Eastern Europe is largely
absent from the Russian market, even though their geographic
position would be very suitable for short haul ﬂights and the oper-
ation of low cost carriers. Apart from the limitations of the bilateral
agreements, an additional obstacle that limits potential air trans-
port demand is the visa requirement that both sides raise for the
citizens of countries in this region.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The comparison of the progress of the liberalisation process in
the four external EU aviation markets provides useful empirical
evidence of the impact of opening international air transport mar-
ket on travel demand and airport competition. The liberalisation of
an international aviation market can have many different shades,
ranging from a simple removal of capacity limitations to a fully
open competitive market that applies common rules. It is evident
that both sides of an international aviation agreement need to
commit to opening their respective markets in order for such an
endeavour to be successful. Nevertheless, each side’s own objec-
tives and market characteristics may delay or cancel further
liberalisation.
National political and economic priorities are the main determi-
nant in international air transport negotiations, often carried out in
a context of a wide range of complicated international agreements.
The limitation on airline ownership imposed by the USA removes
any possibility of ‘beyond rights’ for EU airlines in the form of
the ‘ﬁfth freedom trafﬁc rights’ (the possibility for European airli-
nes operating long haul ﬂights to the USA to offer further connec-
tions from the USA to third countries). This limitation protects the
market of USA airlines, stimulates the formation of alliances and -
indirectly- strengthens the trend for concentration in both airline
and airport competition. Limitations driven by political priorities
are imposed in Russia as well, by maintaining a set of multiple
bilateral agreements between Russia and EU Member States
(instead of a single horizontal agreement) that signiﬁcantly limits
the number of potential market entrants and distorts competition
in favour of Russian airlines. In the case of Morocco, the strategic
decision to make the country more attractive to tourism and busi-
ness out-weighted the potential negative impacts that removing
protectionism would have for local airlines. Turkey also followed
a similar logic, with the added element of promoting the role of
Istanbul as an international hub (a strategy which, however, may
prevent the concession of ‘beyond rights’ to EU carriers.
Geography itself is certainly a factor in the link between liberal-
isation and airport competition. Contrary to the ‘‘long haul, low
cost’’ concept described in Wensveen and Leick (2009), the EU–
USA market is more suitable for double-aisle aircraft that need
economies of scale in order to achieve sustainable seat occupation
rates. Consequently, the market does not favour the operation of
low cost carriers and permits the domination of a few hub-and-
spoke operators. Morocco lies within the reach of LCCs, which have
indeed accomplished a large market share in the EU–Morocco mar-
ket. This has allowed competition between airports in both Europe
and Morocco to be more even and, as a result, many regional air-
ports are used on both sides (in line with the airport and aircraft
size principles that Givoni and Rietveld (2009) describe). Turkey
and Russia are still within the limits of a proﬁtable LCC operation
with a large part of the EU. Their natural catchment area (Central
and Eastern Europe) still has a low per capita demand for new air-
ports to emerge as competitors. The concentration of competition
also depends on the geographic and operational characteristics in
each market. The trans-Atlantic EU–USA market favours hub-
and-spoke networks on both sides, while Russia and Turkey tend
to concentrate their trafﬁc to the Moscow and Istanbul airports
respectively.Comparing the fourmarkets examined here suggests that only in
the case of Morocco did the liberalisation process accelerate growth
and improve the spatial distribution of airport connections. In the
other three cases, the process to open themarket (at higher or lower
speed) seems to have simply followed the existing market trends
and to be greatly inﬂuenced by general political and economic fac-
tors. Several obstacles to a more open market remain. On the
demand side, the main limitations consist of imposing traveller
entry restrictions, normally through the requirement of a visa. On
the supply side, there are types of limitations that affect the pro-
gress of liberalisation and its impact on the spatial aspects of com-
petition in aviation. First, the physical characteristics of a partner’s
market may limit the number of destinations open for competition.
Small countries with few airports, or countries underinvesting in
the development of airport infrastructure, offer limited options
for new routes.
Second, the operational characteristics of the speciﬁc market,
often deﬁned by geography, may limit the options for new com-
petitors to enter the market. This appears to be the case for
trans-Atlantic and other long distance markets for which the low
cost carrier business model is not, at least for the time being, suit-
able. Third, and most important, the regulatory limitations
imposed by the potential partner are inﬂuential. Such limitations
include airline ownership, charging and capacity allocation rules
that may limit the options for non-local players to participate in
the market.Conﬂict of interest
The views expressed are purely those of the author and may not
in any circumstances be regarded as stating an ofﬁcial position of
the European Commission.
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